Good History Of The NorKor Nukes

Bahukutumbi Raman has written a great article for Forbes on the genesis of the NorKor nukes, as well as some original ideas for dealing with this escalating situation:

All eggs were put in the basket of the six-power talks, which were marked by a faith in the ability and readiness of China to make North Korea behave. North Korea skillfully adopted a stratagem of "Talk, test, talk again, test again". It would seemingly cooperate with the talks; agree to some denuclearization measures; then break the agreement under some pretext; test; agree to talk again; break off the talks again under some other pretext; then test again. This has been going on for some years now.

The result: North Korea is a demonstrated nuclear power with a delivery capability at least against South Korea and Japan, if not yet against the U.S. It has carried out
two tests, the second, earlier in May 2009, reportedly more powerful and sophisticated than the first (in 2006). It has reportedly restarted the re-processing of spent fuel rods, which would add to its stockpile of fissile material.

Pre-emption is no longer an option. Can North Korea be pressured or cajoled, through China, to come back to the negotiating table and renew its commitment to the denuclearization path? Even if one succeeds, it is very likely that after some talks, it will break the agreement reached under some other pretext. It broke the last agreement under the pretext that the U.N. had imposed sanctions against it for allegedly testing a communications satellite. The next time, it will find some other supposed reason.

All U.S. administrations have fought shy of a confrontation with North Korea, the Obama administration even more so than its predecessors. The North Korean leadership has concluded that not only the U.S., but even Japan and South Korea, do not have the stomach for a policy of confrontation. Pyongyang therefore feels it does not have to fear either pre-emption or confrontation.

There is one option still left: Threaten China with the possibility of the international community closing its eyes to Japan acquiring military-level nuclear capability if China does not force North Korea to denuclearize. Will it work? It may or may not, but in the absence of any other option, it is well worth a try.

Even while struggling and juggling with various options available against North Korea, it is important for the Obama administration to remember that Tehran is closely watching Obama's handling of North Korea. Any sign of further weakness toward and accommodation of North Korea could encourage Iran in its nuclear obstinacy.

This is decidedly not the time for the Obama administration to convey a wrong message to Iran that ties between the U.S. and Israel are weakening. The U.S. will end up by undermining a steadfast ally for the sake of better relations with an unpredictable country. The U.S. may have valid reasons for improving its relations with Iran, but this should not be at the expense of its relations with Israel.